Doubts about the Spanish Organic Law of General Electoral Regime and the Spanish Transition.
In March 1 2009 I had a bad experience trying to challenge the reported results of the first win, absolute majority, of Alberto Nuñez Feijoo as a President of the Xunta de Galicia, the Galician Government,.
At last that drove me, in a few months, four months, to a forced psychiatric admission by court order and, after that, to a disability sentence, as requested by the public prosecutor.
Results made public on March 1st 2009 said that Alberto Núñez Feijoo, the head of el Partido Popular de Galicia, had won the election to the Parliament of Galicia obtaining 38 seats in the Parliament of Galicia, while the Galician Socialist Party obtained 12 seats and the Galician Nationalist Bloc 25 seats. There were a number of votes of voters abroad still to be recounted, around 90.000 votes, but everyone recognized Feijoo’s victory, and his adversaries inmediately abandoned the political career.
It’s not easy to find the results reported by INDRA on the night of March 1st 2009. Data seem to have vanished from the internet. But there’s a small article, just a note in Wikinoticias dated on March 2nd 2009 that confirms that: “Concluyen las elecciones al Parlamento de Galicia de 2009”. According to it, reported results announced a victory for Nuñez Feijoo of 1 seat, 38 seats.
La Voz de Galicia, the very night it divulged those results (38 :: 25:12) mentioned that precisely that 39th seat of the victory would probably go to the Galician Socialist Party after the count of the vote abroad was finished:
After the allocation of this seat in Ourense to the Galician Socialist Party the Galician Press refers massively to a first reported result of 39/36, that gave way to 38/37.
That’s the view that holds “España Exterior” reporting this fact in 2012:
And it’s also the view of el PAIS: https://elpais.com/diario/2009/03/10/galicia/1236683892_850215.html?event_log=oklogin
And you can find the same data in several places: https://youtu.be/IcLYuokcdfc?si=6ZVHL_ihQ3XuxW_Q
But Pepa Bueno interviewed Feijoo shortly after the results were known. In the first part of her question she mentions his increase of one seat, from 37 to 38, with respect to the 2005 elections, lost by Fraga to Touriño, in which the Popular Party was left with 37 seats. So, these corrections of an initial 39/36 victory are probably only a second thought. This is the interview.
In the 2009 Galician regional election, the PPdeG’s share of seats rose from 37 to 38, thereby giving them an absolute majority of one.[8] In April, he was invested as president by the 8th legislature.[9] He won a second term in the 2012 Galician regional election, which he had called early. Despite receiving over 100,000 votes fewer than in 2009, his party gained three seats due to reduced turnout.[10]
Since then I’ve had an interest for understanding electoral results in Spain, and finally came upon LOREG 5/1985, Ley Orgánica de Régimen Electoral General, Organic Law of General Electoral Regime, that sets the frame for elections in the kingdom of Spain. Many people think this law poses a problem. Nestor Rego Candamil, now a deputy of the Galician Nationalist Bloc in the Spanish Congress in the XV Legislature was the first person who drew my attention to this law.
In my opinion, the LOREG 5/1985 provides an inadequate, obsolete framing for conducting genuine elections in the Kingdom of Spain, this has been so for years and there’s an urgent need to get rid of the Spanish Transition myth and base Spanish democracy on stronger foundations. to change it.
LOREG 5/1985 came in force on June 21st 1985, under the presidency of Felipe González Márquez and preserves in the main of its regulations the content of a Francoist, Royal Law Decree 20/1977 March 18th 1977, on electoral regulations, drafted for the 1977 first Democratic elections. Like this Royal Law Decree 20/1977 March 18th 1977, the LOREG 5/1985 imposes two obligations that must be imperatively obeyed in every election held in Spain:
i) Both impose the destruction of ballots:
* Royal Law Decree 20/1977 of March 18th on electoral regulations, art. 64.7:
Seven. The ballots taken from the ballot boxes shall be destroyed in the presence of those present, with the exception of those which have been denied validity or which have been the object of a complaint, all of which shall be attached to the minutes, once initialed by the members of the Table, and shall be filed with the same.
3. The ballots taken from the ballot boxes shall be destroyed in the presence of those present, with the exception of those which have been denied validity or which have been the object of a complaint, which shall be attached to the minutes and filed with them, once they have been initialed by the members of the Presiding Table.
ii) Both the Royal Law Decree 20/1977 of March 18th on electoral regulations (under TITLE II – Electoral Organization – CHAPTER ONE: The Electoral Roll and the Electoral Boards, arts. 5 – 18) and the LOREG 5/1985 (CHAPTER III – ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION – SECTION I. ELECTORAL BOARDS, arts 8 – 21) put elections under the frame of a complex structure of Electoral Boards composed of Magistrates mainly from the provincial Audience (3: the President and 2 vocals) and well accredited professors (2) with an expertise in Law and Political Science.
These articles constitute an anomaly in European Electoral Laws.
iii) LOREG 5/1985 has a long section on the roll of registrar of citizens which is obsolete too. It starts with Art. 33.1
Art. 33. 1. El censo electoral se ordena por secciones territoriales.
Art.33. 1. The electoral roll is organized by territorial sections.
The electoral administration is made up of the Central, Provincial and Zone Electoral Boards. The Central Electoral Board has its headquarters in Madrid, the provincial electoral boards in the provincial capitals, and the zone electoral boards in the towns at the head of the judicial districts. For the purposes of the present law, the judicial districts coincide with those of the 1979 local elections. LOREG 5/1985 speaks, in section XIV, of a Canvass at the Polling Stations, and in section XV of a General Canvass to be carried out on the fifth day following the day of voting by the corresponding Electoral Board. No mention is made of the aggregation of the results recorded in the minutes of the polling stations. That’s what a reply from the Spanish Gobvernment insists on too: On the other hand, we assure you that the electoral process in our country is clean and meets the highest standards of transparency and quality. After the closing of the polling stations, the counting of the votes of each polling station is carried out. As established in article 95 of the LOREG, this procedure is public. At the end of the scrutiny, it is possible to file protests against the count, and once they are resolved, the minutes are hung at the entrance of the polling station.
In addition, we would like to point out that the general canvass is not the responsibility of Indra. It is a procedure that begins five days after each election by reviewing the minutes of each polling station and is the only official recount in each electoral process.
Electoral processes raise in the Kingdom of Spain several concerns :
1. Destruction of Ballots (LOREG 5/1985, Article 97:3)
– According to Article 97:3 of LOREG 5/1985, ballots are destroyed in the presence of polling station officials after they have been counted and recorded. This legal provision eliminates any opportunity for an independent recount or audit after the initial counting.
– The destruction of ballots removes the primary evidence needed to verify the accuracy of the vote tally, especially in cases where discrepancies may be reported later. This practice leaves the electoral process vulnerable to errors or manipulation, and undermines trust in the final outcome.
2. Aggregation of Results by Indra
– The electoral data from polling stations is transmitted to a central data processing center, often managed by the technology provider Indra. Indra aggregates the results using proprietary technology. While the company claims to ensure accuracy and transparency, the reliance on electronic systems introduces potential risks of data manipulation, either intentional or accidental.
– The absence of a physical paper trail means that any discrepancies in the electronic transmission of results cannot be verified through a recount of ballots, further compounding the issue of transparency.
- Indra activity should be carefully investigated, as well as Indra patents, sale contracts, etc. I’m afraid it might be an extreme right tool for rigging democratic elections all over the world. Before Indra, in the 1960s two aeronautical corporations thrifted in Francoist Spain. Indra is their direct heir.
3. Judicial Review and Lack of Recounting Mechanism
– After the aggregation of results by Indra, a judicial review is conducted by three judges and two professors, the Provincial Electoral Board, Junta Electoral Provincial, there is a Junta Electoral Provincial in each one of the 54 provinces, who examine the same records that were transmitted from polling stations. However, without access to the original ballots, this review is limited to verifying the data already processed, with no means to check if the original vote counts were accurate.
– This process raises concerns about whether the system is capable of catching errors or manipulation that may have occurred earlier in the counting and aggregation process.
4. Historical Context of Judicial Oversight
– Given Spain’s history, the role of the judicial body applying the law under the dictatorship of General Franco for 40 years and the the lingering influence of Francoist judicial figures, there are concerns about the neutrality and independence of the judicial oversight in the electoral process. While this may be a sensitive issue, it is crucial that judicial bodies overseeing electoral integrity are perceived as fully independent and capable of ensuring fairness without bias or influence from political history.
In my experience, the lack of transparency and fairness in the electoral processes in Spain has contributed to an environment where political expression is often met with undue suspicion or hostility. This political atmosphere, exacerbated by flawed electoral processes, has personally affected me in several ways, leading to social stigmatization and legal challenges.
Conducting elections that don’t qualify for real, auditable elections involves the systematic violation of several Human Rights.
Summary of Violated Rights:
Right to take part in the government (Article 21, UDHR); Right to vote in genuine, periodic elections (Article 25, ICCPR); Right to freedom of expression (Article 19, UDHR/ICCPR); Right to equality before the law (Article 7, UDHR); Right to self-determination (Article 1, ICCPR); Right to assembly and association (Articles 20, UDHR and 21, ICCPR); Right to political participation without discrimination (Article 2, UDHR/ICCPR) .
That’s the list an AI assistant, ChatGPT, developed by OPEN AI project, found for me. “…highlighting these specific rights will strengthen your case by grounding it in established international human rights law. If these rights are violated, it fundamentally undermines democracy and the human rights protections of the population”, this AI assistant, ChatGPT -Plus, added.
A report assessing the state of Human Rights in Spain can be read here: https://www.ohchr.org/es/2020/02/statement-professor-philip-alston-united-nations-special-rapporteur-extreme-poverty-and
LOREG 5/1985 is an important part of the Spanish Transition, and the somewhat uncritical applause for the provisions by which the Kingdom of Spain became a parliamentary monarchy. This website, Archivo de la Transicion, provides access to documentation related to the period, listing the political and social organizations that have generated it.
I guess there is no way out of this situation.
This is an overview of the Electoral System of Canada:
This one, the Folketing (Parliamentary) Elections Act in Denmark: